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BOOK REVIEWS
paid medical care offering comprehensive coverage on a service basis.
The detailed account of all these developments is of itself an interesting
story. Of even greater interest is the speculation which it stimulates as
to the impact of further substantial expansion of health insurance
whether private or public upon medical economics.
The voluntary health insurance movement, of which collectively-
bargained health plans are an important part, has been defended as a de-
sirable substitute for a compulsory governmental program. Important
groups in the economy, notably the medical profession and private in-
surance companies, are committed to making this substitute work well
enough to avoid the necessity for a comprehensive governmental pro-
gram. Negotiated plans may contribute to this objective, but cannot be
expected to guarantee its attainment. As Garbarino points out, the ex-
tent of collective bargaining itself appears to have approached limits that
are far short of complete coverage of the labor force. He concludes that
even when all forms of private health insurance are combined, the great
growth of these programs "does not appear to have provided a medical
care system that can forestall a substantial expansion of governmental
participation in the distribution of medical care, at least for certain classes
of the population and possibly to some extent for most of the population."
(p. 279). On the other hand the growth of private health insurance
means that governmental health insurance will not monopolize the field.
An important and challenging question for the future is therefore
the respective roles of private and governmental programs in the provi-
sion of medical care; and, given the continued development of private
plans in general and collectively-bargained plans in particular, the kinds
of modifications and innovations that will emerge in the structure and
performance of the practice of medicine.
TAULMAN A. MILLERt
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. By
A. D. Neale. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Pp. xvi,
519. $7.50.
This volume on American antitrust law is written for the British
reader by a British civil servant. In spite of or perhaps because of this,
it is a notable contribution to antitrust literature and should be of interest
t Professor of Economics, Indiana University.
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to American antitrust scholars and lawyers, and of immense value to
American law students.
The book has many virtues. One is its comprehensiveness, which
is unsurpassed by any single volume I have seen. The author covers the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act in detail and gives attention to the
Federal Trade Commission Act and other pertinent statutes. The statutes
and leading decisions are carefully discussed, and attention is also given
to the procedural and enforcement aspects of the laws. Mr. Neale is at
his best in dealing with the monopoly and conspiracy provisions of the
Sherman Act, and his handling of these is both scholarly and thorough.
He is less effective in dealing with pricing and services under the
Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton Act (especially 2(d) and
2 (e) of the Clayton Act), an understandable weakness-albeit unfortun-
ate since many practicing attorneys often have to ponder over parts of
this section in advising their clients in such matters as furnishing services,
joint advertising, promotional deals and the like. Section 2 contains
tough, practical questions of great importance in the business world and
I do not know.of a really complete treatment of it.
Antitrust law being what it is, probably no reader will agree with
all that Mr. Neale has to say about the decisions and about the rules of
law, but on the whole his presentation is thorough, fair, conservative and
at times penetrating. In addition the author writes with assurance on
the. precise meaning of Chief Justice White's sentences in the Standard
Oil' and American Tobacco2 decisions, and he makes a good case for his
interpretations. I must say that this is something I cannot do; White, to
me, is not comprehensible except on the broadest terms and I must admire
anyone who can read him.
Another virtue of the book is the clarity and smoothness with which
the author writes. The book reads well, flowing in understandable, lit-
erate sentences. The meanings are clear; the points are easy to com-
prehend; there is continuity. It is a joy to read.
The most interesting thing about the volume is the fact that it is
written by an outsider, albeit not an unsympathetic one. Over-all, I con-
clude that Mr. Neale thinks well of our antitrust laws as applied to the
United States. His views on the "whys" of our complex of antitrust
law are well-worth reading for he is a good student of America. In
writing about the motive behind these statutes and decisions he is not
taken in by the technical discourses on economic theory and the like. He
writes:
1. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
2. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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It seems likely that American distrust of all sources of un-
checked power is a more deep-rooted and persistent motive be-
hind the antitrust policy than any economic belief or any radi-
cal political trend. . . . In the United States the fact that some
men possess power over the activities and fortunes of others is
sometimes recognized as inevitable but never accepted as satis-
factory. . . . In large part antitrust is the projection of these
traditional American beliefs into the economic sphere.'
The author's chief dislike appears to be the Robinson-Patman Act.
Here his British common law background seems to influence him and-he
argues that it is a mistake to spell out details in such a statute. Instead
he suggests that stating broad principles in the statute, with the courts
filling in the details, is a better approach. Without defending the exact
language used in Robinson-Patman, I cannot agree with his position as
to all phases of antitrust. Section 5 of the FTC Act is broad and our
courts were almost completely without imagination in filling it out; the
existence of the Clayton Act, as amended, is all that has saved Section 5
from near utter futility. General policy has worked pretty well as to
monopoly, but it is not the tool for pricing matters.
As mentioned, the author is not unfavorable to our antitrust as
limited to this country, but he does not advocate its export in large chunks
to Great Britain. He sees fundamental differences in the two peoples
and in their attitudes toward power. Two quotations will point up his
thinking here.
One of the profoundest institutional differences between
the two countries is the absence in the United States of any-
thing corresponding to the amorphous but recognizable assem-
blage of public bodies and personages that we know in Britain
as 'the Establishment'; and this has much to do, both as cause
and effect, with American distrust of authority per se. In gen-
eral the possession of power by established authorities arouses
a much lesser degree of anxiety or resentment in Britain, where
the emphasis is much more on the use of power.'
In short, the two basic considerations underlying anti-
trust-the wish to disperse economic power and the wish to rely
on judicial processes to do so-though no doubt present to
British opinion, have a lesser impact here than in the United
States. And, when these considerations are removed (or at
3. P. 422.
4. P. 475.
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least weakened), it follows that much more hangs on the eco-
nomic pros and cons of the matter. Since it is less concerned
about the mere existence of private economic power, British
power of monopolies and restrictive associations is exercised;
and this is essentially an economic matter.5
THOMAS W. CHRISTOPHERt
5. P. 476.
'I Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Emory University.
